In Mexico, the card-payment processing market has been reviewed by the Federal Economic Competition Commission (“Cofece”), now the National Antitrust Commission, which found barriers to competition and free market access in that market. In its resolution, the Commission identified that card-payment processing is highly concentrated in two clearing houses (E-Global and Prosa) and recommended that the Bank of Mexico (“Banxico”) and the National Banking and Securities Commission (“CNBV”) amend their regulations to guarantee interoperability among open card-payment networks.
The core problem lies not only in technological infrastructure but also in the regulatory and institutional design of the payment system. In particular, interoperability has largely depended on arrangements among market participants, which may create incentives to restrict the entry of new competitors, preserve closed structures, and maintain market conditions that are unfavorable to competition. In addition, interchange fees and other card-related commissions have drawn regulatory scrutiny because of their potential effect on the final cost for merchants and users.
From a public-policy perspective, the trend is to shift the guarantee of interoperability into a regulatory framework supervised by Banxico and the CNBV, with uniform, transparent, and non-discriminatory rules. Under this approach, interoperability ceases to be a discretionary matter among private parties and becomes a structural element of the payment system, subject to regulatory standards on access, acceptance, and operation.
This approach seeks to correct the anticompetitive effects identified by the antitrust authority and to foster greater dynamism, financial inclusion, and acceptance of electronic payments.
Some of the risks that the issuance of the regulation must address are: i) market concentration in a small number of clearing houses; ii) entry barriers for new participants; iii) relatively high acceptance costs for merchants, particularly MSMEs; and iv) reliance on private agreements for interoperability, with a possible lack of competitive neutrality.
In conclusion, card-payment interoperability faces a legal and regulatory problem rather than a purely technical one. The central issue is to ensure that payment infrastructure operates under open, competitive rules supervised by financial authorities, so that interoperability does not depend on the will of dominant market players.